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Counterfactual Truths 
The Logical Structure of Argumentative Thought Experiments 
 
 
   
       Abstract— Argumentative thought experiments are 
structurally conditional clauses. They can hence be formalized by 
means of the principle of modus ponendo ponens, as well as of 
modus tollendo tollens. In contrast to the practice in formal logic, 
exponents of argumentative thought experiments claim that the 
logical validity of a conclusion drawn within the framework of a 
particular conditional argument also holds beyond the particular 
conditional in question. In this paper, I articulate the criticism that 
this claim is wrong by arguing that the counterfactual scenario sets 
itself the most determinant premise. If the counterfactual scenario 
sets the initial conditional premise of the argument, then its true 
conclusion holds only as a counterfactual truth. The present paper 
illustrates this criticism using Frank Jackson’s thought experiment, 
the so-called knowledge argument, as a concrete example. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The argumentative type of philosophical thought 
experiments is often used fallaciously.1 The fallacious practice 
consists in the treatment of deduced valid conclusions as 
universal or unconditioned true conclusions. This erroneous 
practice is closely related to the function which argumentative 
thought experiments are intended to fulfill. In contrast to the 
argumentative type, illustrative philosophical thought 
experiments are, for instance, used to clarify and exemplify an 
argument or an idea that does not depend, either in content or 
in structure, upon the thought experiment itself. Experimental 
thought experiments, like Einstein’s famous train experiment 
[2], also contrast with the argumentative type. Experimental 
thought experiments are usually intended, for whatever reason, 
to substitute a real experiment, which might be conducted 
later. Unlike their experimental and illustrative counterparts, 
argumentative thought experiments are intended to serve as an 
argument themselves. The narrative of argumentative thought 
experiments simultaneously provides, in addition to a 
depiction of a counterfactual scenario, the elements of a 
                                                            1	  For a typology of thought experiments, see [1], p. 74ff. 
logical argument. Because of their counterfactual character, 
argumentative thought experiments are per definitionem 
conditionals; they are—so to speak—if-arguments. It is in this 
aspect where the erroneous practice comes about. While the 
validity of a conditional relies on its syntax or structure, the 
value of its truth additionally depends on its semantic. The 
fallacious practice of philosophers that use this kind of thought 
experiments resides, therefore, in the identification of the 
truth-value with the validity of the argument. 
 By reference to Frank Jackson’s prominent thought 
experiment of the brilliant neuroscientist Mary [3], I 
demonstrate in Section 2 how this fallacious practice 
exemplarily takes place. In Section 3, I draw the conclusion 
directly from the concrete example that the truths of 
argumentative thought experiments are not universal but rather 
counterfactual truths. This conclusion does not rely, as I shall 
demonstrate, on the syntax alone, but furthermore on the 
semantic which the argumentative thought experiments entail. 
 
II. DEMONSTRATION 
 In order to concentrate the discussion on the particular 
problem I want to demonstrate, I will leave aside all other 
problems related to Frank Jackson’s thought experiment.2 
Problems with the picture that Jackson is trying to set up, for 
instance, will be here completely ignored. In this line of 
thinking, we want to take for granted that the counterfactual 
scenario of a color-blindness-like environment (acromatopsia) 
is narratively well achieved. We take also as given that there is 
agreement upon the understanding of concepts like 
‘knowledge’, ‘learning’ or ‘having all physical information’. 
Finally, we want to assume that Jackson’s thought experiment 
succeeds in its intention. 
 Given all these assumptions, I want to demonstrate that 
the fallacious practice of attributing a universal truth-value to 
counterfactual truths does not rely upon the logical argument 
in question. Rather, the fallacy extends beyond the 
counterfactual character itself. Even assuming that Jackson’s 
argumentative thought experiment succeeds in its intention, it 
                                                            
2 For an extensive discussion on the many problems related to Jackson’s 
thought experiment, see [4]. 
Javier Y. Álvarez-Vázquez, Heidelberg University 
Novelty Journals, ISSN: 2394-9694 
International Journal of Novel Research in Humanity and Social Sciences 
Vol. 2, Issue 2, pp: (1-3), Month: March-April 2015 
Available at: www.noveltyjournals.com/journal/IJNRHSS/Issue-2-March-2015-April-2015/0 
 
 2 
proves itself to be fallacious by claiming its truth as universal 
or unconditioned. Our example reads in its essential passages 
as follows: 
 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, 
forced to investigate the world from a black and white 
room via a black and white television monitor. She 
specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and 
acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information 
there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe 
tomatoes, of the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and 
so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-
length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, 
and exactly how this produces via the central nervous 
system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion 
of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the 
sentence ‘The sky is blue’. […]  
What will happen when Mary is released from her 
black and white room or is given a colour television 
monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just 
obvious that she will learn something about the world 
and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable 
that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she 
had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to 
have than that, and Physicalism is false. ([3], p. 130. My 
emphasis.) 
 
This argumentative thought experiment can be formalized 
after the principle modus ponendo ponens. It is intended to 
prove that physicalism is false, where physicalism is 
exemplified as ‘Mary does not learn anything new’. The 
implied sentences are defined as follows: 
 
V1(p) =  Mary live in a color-blindness-like environment 
and has all physical information (knowledge) 
concerning colors and color-related phenomena. 
 
V1(q) =  Mary leaves the color-blindness-like environment 
and experiences the world in its full-color 
appearance. 
 
V1(r) =  Mary does learn something about colors or color-
related phenomena from that experience. 
 
Given this valuation of the sentences, we can formalize it as 
the following logical argument: 
 
(p ∧ q) → r 
 p ∧ q 
___________ 
 r 
 
From the viewpoint of a “qualia freak”, as Jackson describes 
himself, and as the structure of the conditional refers, the 
occurrences of p and q are sufficient conditions for r. 
Although the possibility of other antecedents for the 
occurrence of r remains open, those possible antecedents have 
to be mentioned in order to build a logical argument with 
them. Such other possibilities are absent in Jackson’s narrative 
and therefore they have to remain unknown for the occurrence 
of r.  
However, for a physicalist, who might insist that Mary 
does not really learn anything new in spite of the new lived 
experience, the occurrences of p and q are more than just 
sufficient conditions. Jackson’s thought experiment 
exemplifies the attacked physicalism as the case that ‘Mary 
does not learn anything’, namely ¬r. Given the case that Mary 
does not really learn anything new (¬r) and the conditional 
still holds, the argument reads as follows: 
 
(p ∧ q) → r 
 ¬r 
___________ 
¬(p ∧ q) 
 
This formalization of the argument implied in Jackson’s 
thought experiment is in fact the modus tollendo tollens 
version of the conditional written above. It characterizes the 
initial premise that expresses the occurrences of p and q as a 
necessary condition for r. In contrast to the modus ponendo 
ponens version, where the initial premise is characterized as a 
sufficient condition, here it receives a stronger 
characterization as a necessary condition in relation to the case 
that ¬r. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on these logical facts and argumentative 
dynamics, I argue that if r is true, its truth-value either 
depends sufficiently or necessarily from the initial premise of 
the conditional. In the case of argumentative thought 
experiments, as discussed above, their initial premises are in 
their content constituted by the counterfactual scenarios. This 
means that argumentative thought experiments, insofar 
understood as conditional logical arguments, are always 
conditioned by their counterfactual scenarios. In contrast to 
the predominant treatment of the consequences from such 
argumentative thought experiments, the truth deduced from 
their premises is also conditioned by their counterfactual 
framework. The truths of such counterfactual arguments are, 
therefore, counterfactual truths. As counterfactual truths, they 
do not hold as universal or unconditioned, because their truth-
value depends on the occurrences of p and q, as well as their 
particular valuation. 
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